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Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States," sanctions cash compensation
for a coal company whose investment-backed expectations of strip mining
have been regulatorily prohibited by the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 2 Section 1260(b)(5) of SMCRA not only
precludes strip mining on alluvial valley floors which are suitable for
farming, but also permits the exchange of federal coal land for precluded
private coal land. In Whitney, the court interpreted section 1260(b)(5) as
permitting the company to reject such an exchange and opt for cash
compensation under the Tucker Act.3 Thus, the Whitney decision allows
section 1260(b)(5) to become a potential conduit for liquidating non-
productive coal assets located in western alluvial valleys.
II. CASE HISTORY
Whitney Benefits, Inc. owned two parcels of coal land in the Tongue
River valley ten miles north of Sheridan, Wyoming. Whitney leased the
parcels to a commercial coal company, Peter Kiewit Sons.4 In 1979,
Whitney submitted a strip mining application to the Wyoming Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (DEQ).5 The DEQ rejected the applica-
tion because the operation of the coal strip mine would be on alluvial valley
floors, and therefore in violation of SMCRA, section 1260(b)(5), which
prohibits surface coal mining on alluvial valley floors which are suitable for
1. 752 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
2. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1982). First enacted in 1977, the section provides:
No permit or revision application shall be approved unless the application affirmatively
demonstrates ... that ... (5) the proposed surface coal mining operation... would (A) not
interrupt, discontinue, or preclude farming on alluvial valley floors that are irrigated or
naturally subirrigated... [Furthermore, it] is the policy of Congress that the Secretary shall
develop and carry out a coal exchange program to acquire private fee coal precluded from
being mined by the restrictions of this paragraph (5) in exchange for Federal coal which is
not so precluded. Such exchanges shall be made under section 1716 of Title 43.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). The Tucker Act provides:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
4. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1555.
5. Id.
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farming.6 Section 1260(b) (5) also provides that the alluvial coal land may
be exchanged for non-alluvial federal coal land.7 Both the United States
and Whitney agree that the legislative purpose of section 1260(b)(5)
reflects a special objection to strip mining on alluvial valley floors.8
Upon rejection by the DEQ, Whitney submitted to the Secretary of
the Interior a proposed exchange of its coal for federal coal under the
provisions of section 1260(b)(5). 9 However, by 1984, the parties had not
reached an agreement on the value and location of exchange tracts.
Therefore, Whitney asserted that the long delay rendered the exchange
provision illusory, and that Whitney should receive cash compensation
under the Tucker Act.'0
Whitney brought this action in the United States Court of Claims to
force the Interior Department to compensate Whitney in cash for the coal
Whitney owned but could not mine." In an unpublished bench decision,
the Court of Claims dismissed the suit without prejudice. 2 The Court of
Claims held that the exchange provision of section 1260(b)(5) provided, on
its face, for just compensation. Therefore, Whitney did not have a claim for
cash compensation under the Tucker Act.'3 The Claims Court placed the
burden on plaintiff Whitney to prove unconstitutional delay or denial of the
section 1260(b)(5) exchange. "' Under the facts, the Court of Claims
determined that no taking had occurred up to the date of the hearing.
Furthermore, the Claims Court was uncertain whether a taking would ever
occur. 15 Whitney appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.'"
The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of Claims and remanded, 7
ruling that section 1260(b)(5)'s prohibitions on surface mining of western
alluvial valleys may effectively preclude Whitney's realization of invest-
ment-backed expectations.' 8 Therefore, Whitney should have an opportu-
nity to prove that section 1260(b)(5) effects a constitutional taking. 9
The Federal Circuit further held that the affected owners of the
6. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5).
7. Id.
8. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1555.
9. Id. at 1555-56.
10. Id. at 1556.
II. Id. at 1555.
12. Id. at 1556.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1555.
16. Id.





mineral rights may elect to seek monetary relief through the Tucker Act,
rather than through an exchange of lands under section 1260(b)(5) of
SMCRA. Although the language is ambiguous, the court apparently
concluded that the exchange provision of section 1260(b)(5) may be used
to ascertain the amount of just compensation.20
III. ANALYSIS
A. Developments Leading to the Whitney Decision
The Whitney decision announces the latest development in a series of
regulatory takings cases that began over fifty years ago. Whitney is unique
because it is the first case to focus on a regulatory taking within the coal
exchange context of section 1260(b)(5) of SMCRA.2' The modern
principles of general regulatory takings began with a 1922 United States
Supreme Court case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.22 The Mahon
court held that a state statute which effectively deprived the plaintiff of the
right to mine its coal land constituted a taking compensable under the fifth
amendment. The Supreme Court stated that the property owner must be
left some reasonable return on his investment.23 Justice Holmes provided
the classic statement, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 24
The "reasonable return" test of Mahon was later supported by Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.25 When discussing the
factors that constitute a taking, the Court stated, "The economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
are, of course, relevant considerations." 2 Importantly, the Court noted
that, "a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose
...or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh inpact upon the owner's use of the
property. '27 However, the Court cautioned that it "has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness'
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
20. Id. "Actually the exchange transaction is a method of ascertaining and paying just
compensation for a taking, which may be agreed upon either before or after the taking itself, and is
optional with the claimants, who may reject any exchange and pursue a money award under the Tucker
Act."
21. Supra note 2.
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. Id. at 414.
24. Id. at 415.
25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id. at 127.
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the government .... 128 Thus the Court admonished that regulatory
takings cases can only be resolved through reason in light of common sense
and experience, not by mechanical application of formulae.
Two recent cases applied Penn Central's ad hoc factual inquiries to
government actions which had the effect of a regulatory taking of mining
property. In Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States,29 the claimant asserted
that the United States Corps of Engineers had denied it the opportunity to
extract minerals. The United States owned the surface estate, and Yuba
owned the underlying mineral estate, which it had mined since 1905.10
Without citing any authority, the Corps wrote to Yuba stating that
"[d] redging activity or removal of any material, including precious metals,
is prohibited." 3' The court held that the Corp's actions may constitute a de
facto taking, because, "[w]hat the government appears to have done here
was to prevent Yuba from mining minerals for about six years."32 The
court remanded for a factual determination on the taking issue. 3 The
Whitney court analogized the Corp's actions in Yuba to the effect of section
1260(b)(5), stating that "the frustration of mining operations can be a
taking even though the government believes it is only protecting its legal
rights." ' Similarly in Skaw v. United States,35 a factual dispute arose over
whether government prohibitions of mining activities constituted a taking.
The Federal Circuit found that a regulatory taking occurred when a miner
who could only mine his riverbed property by a dredge method, was
prohibited from doing so by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 36 The
environmental regulations of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act focus on the
pristine nature of rivers, thereby differing from the "prime farmland"
focus of section 1260(b)(5). However, in Skaw the Act's regulatory taking
was similar to a taking under section 1260(b)(5) because both acts
deprived the owners of the beneficial use of their mineral property. The
Federal Circuit held in Skaw that Congress did not intend to withdraw the
Tucker Act remedy for recovery of just compensation for such a regulatory
mineral taking.37
The first case to directly address the regulatory taking effect of
SMCRA was Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
28. Id. at 124.
29. 723 F.2d 884 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 885.
31. Id. at 886.
32. Id. at 890.
33. Id. at 891.
34. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1560.
35. 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 938.
37, Id. at 939.
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Association.38 The Supreme Court held that the provision of SMCRA
which prohibited mining in certain locations did not, on its face, deny the
owner the economically viable use of his coal-bearing lands.3 9 The Court in
Virginia Surface Mining reemphasized the Penn Central standard which
considered the "economic impact of.the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action."' 0 The Court reiterated the the test for a regulatory
taking: "a statute regulating the uses of property effects a taking if it
'denies an owner economically viable use of his land . . ' ."'
While Virginia Surface Mining focused on the "steep-slopes" and
"approximate original contours " provisions of SMCRA,42 Hodel v.
Indiana,43 which immediately followed Virginia Surface Mining, focused
on the "prime farmland" sections of SMCRA. The Court in Hodel v.
Indiana repeated the eminent domain reasoning, "Our review of the
questions presented by this case leads us to the same conclusion that we
reached in Virginia Surface Mining. The Surface Mining Act is not
vulnerable to appellee's pre-enforcement challenge. '44 The Court there-
fore held that the "prime farmland" provisions "do not, on their face,
deprive a property owner of the economically beneficial use of his
property."4 5
Although it did not cite Hodel v. Indiana, the Federal Circuit court in
Whitney did invoke Virginia Surface Mining by stating, "we deal solely
and only with alluvial farm land located west of the 100th parallel. The
important teaching of [Virginia Surface Mining] is that because of the ad
hoc nature of the inquiry, a sweeping fifth amendment attack is not
possible."'4 1 The Whitney decision thereby echoes Penn Central's ad hoc
factual inquiry approach for determining whether a taking had occurred.
In addition, the court legally distinguished the method of compensation for
section 1260(b) (5) takings and Virginia Surface Mining takings: "Here
the language to be construed provides more than mere regulations. It
specifically visualizes government acquisition of interest in land. '47
Thus, the chain of cases from Mahon through Virginia Surface
Mining set the stage for the reasoning in the Whitney decision, by
38. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
39. Id. at 296.
40. Id. at 295.
41. Id. at 296.
42. Id. at 284.
43. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
44. Id. at 336.
45. Id. at 335.
46. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1558-59.
47. Id.
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progressively refining the principle that excessive mineral regulation may
constitute a taking. Having established this base, the court in Whitney then
turned to a determination of the method of compensation allowable under
section 1260(b)(5).
B. The Court's Reasoning
In its first holding, the Federal Circuit court stated that prohibitions
on surface mining in section 1260(b)(5) of SMCRA might be a taking, if
Whitney could demonstrate that its investment-backed expectations had
been effectively precluded.48 The court reasoned that the aggrieved owners
of specific tracts must show that they have taken all reasonable advantage
of hardship exceptions and regulation remedies before bringing the fifth
amendment suit.49 The court cited the Kaiser Aetna v. United States
decision, which insisted that takings cases must not be resolved by
mechanical application of formulae but through reason in light of common
sense and experience. 50 In Whitney, the court noted that Congress
recognized it might owe money to certain persons as a result of its
legislation, and authorized appropriations for this purpose. 51 In addition,
the Federal Circuit reasoned that there may be no other economically
viable uses for Whitney's property. By applying the economic impact
standard enunciated in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association, Inc.,52 the court reasoned that there may have been a
regulatory taking, and that Whitney may be entitled to compensation.53
Citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the court then
addressed the question of whether a regulation is so onerous as to effect a
taking by imputation, with no provision for money compensation.54 The
court reasoned that if the regulation requires a landowner to accept a
substitute, instead of money, he is in a worse position than if the regulation
allows the option of a substitute.55 Therefore, the court reasoned, "Con-
gress did not mean to force an exchange upon a claimant not so minded. '56
This reasoning led to the second holding.
The second holding by the Federal Circuit stated that the pursuit of a
48. Id. at 1560.
49. Id. at 1559.
50. Id. at 1558 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1975)). The Kaiser
Court also stated that "confiscation may result from a taking of the use of property without
compensation quite as well as from the taking of the title." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174 n. 8 (citing
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 (1931)).
51. Id. at 1559.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1560.
54. Id. at 1557.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1556.
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substitution or exchange transaction under section 1260(b)(5) is not
mandatory, but optional with the landowner.57 The court noted the
reference in section 1260(b)(5) to the land exchange provision of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 58 where exchanges
under FLPMA are not authorized without the private parties' consent.59
Therefore, the court reasoned that the landowner retains the additional
option to sue for money in the Court of Claims, if the landowner does not
consent to the exchange .6 This option is compatible with a claim for a
regulatory taking and may be exercised after the plaintiff has shown a
taking occurred. 6' Furthermore, the court appeared to hold that the
exchange provision of section 1260(b)(5) is a method of ascertaining the
amount of cash compensation under the Tucker Act.62 Reasoning that the
Tucker Act cash settlement remained a viable option, the court empha-
sized that "statutory supersession of the Tucker Act is not to be lightly
implied."'63 The court also noted that the Supreme Court views the Tucker
Act as a safety net to assure compliance with just compensation
requirements.6 4
After establishing that cash compensation under the Tucker Act is a
viable option, the next issue was the establishment of the date of taking,
which in effect, would establish the value of compensation for the taking.
Plaintiff Whitney alleged that section 1260(b)(5) effectively halted
economic development of its land on the date of passage. The court
analogized Whitney's position to the corporate developer's position in
Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States.6 5 In Drakes, a real estate
development corporation alleged that the National Park Service had
denied it an access easement to its property, thereby effecting a taking. The
court in Drakes stated that the taking occurred on the date when the
corporation's economic development was effectively precluded by the Park
Service's refusal to purchase the now inaccessible property.66
The Park Service's refusal to purchase the property may be analogous
to the Department of Interior's reluctance to offer an acceptable exchange
of property in Whitney, thus creating a factual dispute over the date of the
taking. Therefore the court in Whitney remanded the case, reasoning that
57. Id. at 1558.
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1716 (1982).
59. Whitney, 752 F.2d. at 1557.
60. Id. at 1558.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1560.
63. Id. at 1556.
64. Id. at 1558.
65. 424 F.2d 574, 191 Ct. CI. 389 (1970).
66. Id. at 588, 191 Ct. C1. at 414.
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Whitney "may be able to prove that a constitutional taking has occurred as
of the date of legislation . . . or some subsequent date that has already
occurred. '67 The court remained hopeful that an exchange could be
transacted. 68
The Chief Justice of the Federal Circuit, Justice Markey, strongly
dissented. He argued that a restriction on the right to extract minerals in a
particular manner may not be a taking if there are alternative methods to
profitably mine the property.69 The Chief Justice basically felt that section
1260(b)(5) had not crossed the critical threshold from acceptable regula-
tion into onerous taking. "Because I consider Congress' removal of the
freedom to strip mine as not in itself constituting a judicially recognizable
taking, and because [Whitney] has not alleged facts indicating that strip
mining is the only economically viable use, I would dismiss the complaint
... ,70 Justice Markey reasoned that Whitney's narrow economic
interest in strip mining had not blossomed into a full "property right"
justifying compensation.71 The Chief Justice concluded that Whitney's
relief should be limited to an exchange.72
C. Implications
The Whitney decision gives coal companies a new compensation tool
through section 1260(b)(5). The coal companies may now make section
1260(b)(5) taking claims and demand either exchange or compensation
for environmental restrictions which have effectively frozen their invest-
ment expectations. The statute permits an exchange of private coal, which
has been regulatorily precluded from being mined, for federal coal which
has not been so precluded. Alternatively, the value of the federal land
offered for exchange can be used to ascertain the cash compensation value
under the Tucker Act. Thus, Whitney may allow section 1260(b)(5) to
become a conduit for "cashing-in" an undeveloped coal asset. Whitney is
the first judicial test of section 1260(b)(5). On remand, the questions
facing the lower court are straightforward. Does the denial of the permit to
strip mine constitute a frustration of mining operation? 73 Does this
frustration constitute a denial of reasonable beneficial use, thereby
creating a taking?74
Plaintiff Whitney is a private land owner who purchased coal land
67. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1560.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1562 (Markey, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1563.
71. Id. at 1563-64 (citing United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,502 (1945)).
72. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1564.




prior to the enactment of SMCRA. Whitney's property was cut short of
commercial development. The "reasonable return" criterion of Penn
Central is fair and equitable, but only when the landowner pays value for
the property knowing of the risk of government regulation, because the
market price will reflect the risk. The issue of fairness becomes particularly
important when the price the owner pays does not reflect that risk, because
the possibility of government action has not yet reared its head. Essentially,
Whitney purchased the property at a premium commercial price, and is
now saddled with a non-productive asset.
If the Department of Interior offers an exchange that plaintiff
Whitney considers reasonable, Whitney may use the value of the offered
exchange land to ascertain its cash compensation under the Tucker Act.
Although Whitney may accept the land exchange, the depressed price of
coal in 1986 makes acceptance unlikely. Sound business practice requires
that an asset be transferred into a form that maximizes return on
investment. In the current depressed coal market, Whitney would probably
want to liquidate its coal land asset, and therefore pursue the Tucker Act
cash compensation.
If the Department of Interior offers an exchange that Whitney
considers unreasonable, Whitney faces a double burden. First, Whitney
must prove to the court that the federal offer is unreasonable, leaving
Whitney with no viable section 1260(b)(5) exchange. Second, Whitney
must prove that the lack of a viable exchange, combined with the
regulatory restrictions of section 1260(b)(5), leaves Whitney with no
reasonable beneficial use of its property. When deciding this issue, the
court must focus on the commercial return on the "permitted uses"
available to Whitney.7 5 Whitney must argue that the United States has so
seriously interfered with its right to use and enjoy its property as to render
the property economically useless. Ultimately, Whitney must prove that
any method of mining, other than strip mining, is commercially infeasible.
As Justice Holmes said, "What makes the right to mine coal valuable
is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impractica-
ble to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it."'7 6 Furthermore, permissible
governmental regulatory action does not constitute a compensable taking
merely because the result may diminish the value of the property or prevent
its most beneficial use.7 Thus, the taking is an open issue.
On remand, if the lower court does find a taking, the property owner
75. Id. at 1557.
76. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
77. Skaw, 740 F.2d at 939.
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must normally be paid the fair market value of the property. 8 The date of
the taking may have occurred when economic development was effectively
prevented?9 Any subsequent enhancement or dimunition in value, result-
ing from the acquisition itself, must be excluded from constitutional just
compensation. 0 Also, mere fluctuations in value during the process of
governmental decision-making, absent extraordinary delay, are incidents
of ownership which cannot be considered a taking in the constitutional
sense.
81
The Whitney case is ripe for a dispute over the fair market value of
Whitney's coal land, and therefore the value of the federal land offered in
exchange. When was the economic development prevented? Should the
fair market value be determined on the date of SMCRA's passage in 1977,
which precluded the realization of plaintiffs' investment-backed expecta-
tions, or should the fair market value reflect current market conditions?
This question is critical to the determination of just compensation, because
the fair market value of coal fluctuates.82 Just compensation in federal
taking cases is not determined by any one formula of valuation but by
methods of assessment that vary according to the circumstances. 83 If direct
market evidence of fair market value is unavailable, the fair market value
of comparable land with comparable restrictions or potential may be used
in valuation. 4 Recently, the General Accounting Office reasoned that the
word "fair" does not refer to the justness of the amount received, but to the
method by which the amount is determined.8 5 If the Department of
Interior offers federal coal land in exchange, and if the coal land reasonably
falls within the general guidelines of fair market value, then Whitney has
no choice but to accept the exchange land or alternatively accept the cash
value of the land under the Tucker Act. Ultimately, if the Department of
78. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 517 (1979).
79. Drakes Bay, 424 F.2d at 588.
80. Id. at 584.
81. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 255, 263 n.9 (1980).
82. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, 43 C.F.R. 3400.0-5(n) (1985) provides:
"Fair market value" means that amount in cash, or on terms reasonably equivalent to cash,
for which in all probability the coal deposit would be sold or leased by a knowledgeable
owner willing but not obligated to sell or lease to a knowledgeable purchaser who desires but
is not obligated to buy or lease.
83. Thurston, Achieving "Fair Market Value", 9 COLUMBIA J. OF ENVTL. LAW, 237, 249
(1984).
84. United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1972).
85. Thurston, supra note 83 at 239 (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Pub. No. GAO/RCED-83-119, ANALYSIS OFTHE POWDER RIVER BASIN FEDERAL COAL LEASE SALE:
ECONOMIC VALUATION IMPROVEMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES NEEDED 45 (1983): "The 'fair'
element of the term 'fair market value' applies to the methodof determining market value. The market
value of the coal does not necessarily have to be'fair.' Rather it has to reflect the lease's value at the time
and place of the sale -fairly determined.") (emphasis in the original).
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Interior offers a reasonable exchange, it can determine the amount of
compensation Whitney will receive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Whitney court found that section 1260(b)(5) of SMCRA's
"prime farmland" restrictions on strip mining may be a regulatory taking
of private coal land situated in western alluvial valleys, by prohibiting the
owner's investment-backed expectations.
In a case of first impression, the Whitney decision bestows federal
court approval on the section 1260(b)(5) exchange provision, which
permits the exchange of federal coal land for private coal land which has
been regulatorily precluded from development. Secondly, Whitney permits
the precluded coal owner to opt for cash compensation under the Tucker
Act, where the offered federal exchange land sets the value of the cash
compensation.86
Thus, Whitney has effectively allowed cash compensation for regula-
tory restrictions on strip mining. More subtly, Whitney enables the owner
of precluded coal land to liquidate a non-productive asset. However, if the
private owner rejects the offered exchange land, the owner bears the dual
burden of proving both the taking and the date of the taking. Ultimately,
the Whitney decision may allow section 1260(b) (5) to become a conduit for
"cashing-in" coal assets in western alluvial valleys.
86. Whitney, 752 F.2d at 1560.
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